Intrusion Detection Systems: A Background

A. Background
Pathan [6] discusses the evolution, implementation, and operation of intrusion detection systems (IDS). Intrusion detection systems have been around since the beginning of the internet. Although IDS saw vast improvement in the 1980s, it was not until the early 1990s that IDS found commercial significance with the invention of the automated security measurement system (ASIM) by the US Air Force. IDS are now one of the most popular methods of security in networking.
IDS can be classified into two main categories: misuse IDS (commonly referred to as signature-based IDS) and anomaly-based IDS.
Misuse IDS identify potential attacks on a network by comparing the attack to known signatures which have been encoded into an expert database. Through the pattern matching method, misuse IDS match snippets of text or binary acquired from the malicious packet to formerly established signatures. Misuse IDS are susceptible to many limitations, including the ability of hackers to circumvent the system altogether by simply changing around certain pieces of their code such that no signature in the database matches the malicious code. The biggest limitation of misuse IDS is simply that they lack the ability to detect zero-day attacks on a network (attack for which there is no known signature). Anomaly-based IDS on the other hand are capable of identifying attacks that have never been detected before. Anomaly-based IDS create models that represent the normal or expected behaviour of networks. Deviations from this expected behaviour raise an alarm. Both types of detection systems have four possible outcomes. A false negative is the most dangerous outcome in which the system fails to detect an actual attack. A true negative occurs when the system correctly dismisses network traffic as non-malicious. False positives are where the IDS misidentifies specific traffic as an intrusion. Finally, a true positive is the ideal situation in which an IDS correctly identifies an attack (Pathan [6] ).
IDS architecture can be broken down into three main types: hostbased IDS (HIDS), network-based IDS (NIDS), and hybrids. HIDS monitor behaviour on a specific machine and confront threats directed to the machine without having to capture traffic from the whole network.
NIDS, on the other hand, monitor data on large pieces of the network.
NIDS consist of a data collector, manager, and communication module that transmits/receives analysis results. Neither type of architecture is capable of monitoring encrypted traffic. Hybrid combines the advantages of HIDS and NIDS into one system. Generally, hybrids combine misuse and anomaly-based methods in order to maximize detection and minimize false positives. Hybrids also allow for centralized management of the network as well as each individual host. IDS architecture can be centralized (one manager responsible for event analysis, detection, classification, and system action), hierarchical (NIDS and HIDS managed separately), or distributed (multiple agents handle processing, analysis, and detection) (Pathan [6] ).
Once an intrusion is detected, the IDS has a few different postdetection options. The system can take an active approach, which is commonly referred to as an intrusion prevention system (IPS). The IPS sends packets to the site of the intrusion in order to interrupt and/or cease the connection. The IPS also interacts with the edge routers (routers standing between the network and the outside world) in order to establish rules regarding certain, potentially hazardous, source addresses. In contrast to the active approach, the system can take a passive approach where it simply generates and sends notifications to the system operator indicating that there has been an intrusion (Pathan [6] ).
In addition to the pattern-based method inherent in misuse IDS, IDS can take a few other approaches to detect intrusions. Most IDS analyze the header contents of common protocols: internet protocol (IP), transmission control protocol (TCP), and user datagram protocol (UDP).
More advanced IDS go further, performing what is known as "protocol analysis". If anything about the traffic deviates from the standards established by the industry protocol, then the system raises an alarm.
Protocol analysis facilitates detection of both known and unknown attacks; thus, it falls under the category of anomaly-based IDS since it looks for anomalies in the protocol standards. IDS can also use the statistical and probabilistic approach. Instead of rules or signatures, many IDS rely on Bayesian statistics, which are heavily centered on conditional probability. The Bayesian model is created using both real attack samples and false positive samples (the sample must be large).
The statistical approach is generally implemented into an already existing misuse IDS in order to increase the system's accuracy. Finally, the neural network based approach is an approach that requires no user defined parameters. Instead, it emphasizes constant learning based on experience. Neural network based IDS are mostly research-based as of right now; commercial products are a rarity.
Bolzoni et al. [2] claim that anomaly-based intrusion detection systems are often inefficient when it comes to classifying the attacks they detect. Therefore, security teams or administrators have to manually process each alert generated by the IDS. There are two main challenges for security personnel. First, the most harmful attacks occur in stages and security teams must catch these attacks in the early stages. Second, there are a lot of alerts generated by BOTnets and automatic scanners that, although considered true positives, are not regarded as harmful. SVM is a set of supervised learning methods used for classification. SVM uses "support vectors" and "margins" to classify data into different groups and then assigns new data to a specific group based on distance (Bolzoni et al. [2] ). RIPPER is a rule induction algorithm that uses a set of IF-THEN rules. IF (condition), THEN (conclusion). Essentially, RIPPER takes already identified data, and builds an algorithm from the ground up that accurately classifies each data value. It heuristically adds one condition at a time until all of the data has been accurately classified.
RIPPER then implements an optimization phase in order to simplify the set. Once the algorithm has performed on the teaching set, it is ready to be used on outside sources of intrusion. After implementing the algorithms, the study showed that the classification accuracy is almost always above 75%, with SVM outperforming RIPPER by a narrow margin in each trial (Bolzoni et al. [2] ).
Clustering Methods
A. Cluster analysis
Leung and Leckie [4] provide a good overview of cluster analysis methods. Unsupervised anomaly detection makes two assumptions about the data: the majority of the network data is normal and some portion is malicious; the attack traffic is statistically different from the normal traffic. The algorithm takes unlabelled data and attempts to find intrusions buried in the data. Many techniques involve the classification of threats first through clustering, then intrusion detection through the use of an algorithm.
Clustering is the method of grouping observations into meaningful subclasses. Members of a subclass are meant to be similar whereas members of different clusters should be noticeably different. Clustering methods can be useful in classifying large amounts of data. Once an observation is labelled, it is then grouped into a cluster with observations that share similar traits.
A few different clustering methods currently in use are partitioning methods, density-based methods, and grid-based methods. Given a database of n objects, a partitioning method constructs k partitions of data where each partition represents a cluster. Density-based methods are based on the assumption that clusters are dense regions in the data space that are separated by regions of lower density. Rather than data points being assigned to a cluster, a cluster is defined as a specific density or higher within a given radius. Grid-based methods divide the xy grid into a finite number of cells. This approach has a very fast processing time. The algorithm in Leung's paper assumes that any point falling within the clusters is normal while all others are considered anomalies (Leung and Leckie [4] ). In many cases, clustering algorithms will place anomalies in an entirely separate cluster of their own.
B. K-means and k-means++
Arthur and Vassilvitskii [1] provide insight into the method of k-means++. In the original k-means formulation, we are given an integer k and a set of n data points. The goal is to choose k centers in a way that minimizes , ϕ the sum of the squared distances between each point and its closest center. K-means involves choosing k centers (usually uniformly random) and assigning each data point to the closest center. The center is then recalculated to be the center of mass of the cluster of data points.
This process occurs over and over until the optimal clustering out of all n k possibilities is achieved.
where c is the mean of a specific cluster center, and x is the value of a given observation.
Arthur and Vassilvitskii propose a way of initializing k-means by choosing random starting centers with very specific probabilities -choose a point p as a center with probability proportional to p's contribution to the overall potential. In the original k-means, we choose initial centers uniformly at random. By recalculating the center of mass of each cluster during each iteration, ϕ is guaranteed to decrease with each iteration.
The algorithm for k-means is:
set the cluster i C to be the set of points in X that are closer to i c than they are to j c for all The k-means++ also begins with an arbitrary set of cluster centers; however, k-means++ employs a new algorithm:
denote the shortest distance from a data point x to the closest center which we choose.
1a. Choose an initial center 1 c uniformly at random from X.
1b. Choose the next center ,
weighting".
1c. Repeat
Step 1b until we have chosen a total of k centers. There is an alternate supervised anomaly detection method called "K-means + C4.5" (Muniyandi et al. [5] ). It combines k-means with the C4.5 decision tree. The k-means method is cascaded with the C4.5 by building decision trees using the instances in each k-means cluster. This alleviates two problems in k-means: forced assignment and class dominance. Forced assignment occurs when the k parameter is significantly less than the number of natural groupings within the training data. Class dominance occurs in a cluster when the training data has a large number of instances from one class and very few instances from the others. Cascading involves the selection phase and the classification phase. In the selection phase, the closest cluster to the observation is selected. In the selected cluster, the decision tree corresponding to that cluster is generated. In the classification phase, the test instance is classified as normal or anomaly (intrusion) using the decision tree result. The observation is included in the cluster with a label of either normal or anomaly.
The C4.5 algorithm is as follows:
Given a set S of cases, C4.5 grows an initial decision tree using a divide-and-conquer algorithm.
"1. If all the cases in S belong to the same class or S is small, the tree is a "leaf" (i.e., box) labelled with the most frequent class in S.
A. Otherwise, choose a test based on a single attribute with two or more outcomes (i.e., great than, less than). Make this test the root of the tree with one branch for each outcome of the test, partition S into corresponding subsets S1, S2, … according to the outcome for each case, and apply the same procedure recursively to each subset" (Muniyandi et al. [5] ).
K-means + C4.5 does noticeably better than k-means alone when classifying a data set. 
K-means
The Data Set
A. Data source
The effective comparison of various intrusion detection systems is hinged upon implementing the systems across a robust and realistic data set. Data sets are more often than not suboptimal for the needs of intrusion detection research. Most data sets are static datasets which means that they likely fail to reflect the most current and ever-changing state of intrusions. Static data sets are simply "outdated, unmodifiable, inextensible, and irreproducible" (Shiravi) . Intrusion detection systems must be rigorously tested, evaluated, and retested prior to their implementation into real-world applications. The best method for testing and evaluating an IDS is running it through a real network that is transmitting both normal and intrusive traffic. However, realistic data sets are extremely hard to come by, and most data sets that are readily available are over-specified to the IDS that they were originally created to test.
The 
B. The attack: Brute force SSH
Secure shell (SSH) is a protocol used for remote login which allows a user to securely operate a remote host over an unsecure network. A brute force attack occurs when a system such as a BOTnet tries to crack a password by simply testing a high volume of randomly generated combinations of characters or words (Shiravi) . As password length increases, the average amount of time to find the correct password increases exponentially.
Brute force attacks are a very common type of intrusion since they can break into accounts with weak username-password combinations.
The dataset that we are using contains various instances of brute force attacks which pursued an SSH account on the simulated UNB network.
The attacks used a dictionary style method; the protocol ran through a 5000 word dictionary that contains entries of varying lengths and characters. The overall attack ran for 30 minutes and was able to acquire the account credentials of the network admin. The attacker then used the account credentials to remotely log into the server (Shiravi).
C. Initial data analysis
Each protocol executed in the network is defined in the dataset by a range of variables, including the source and destination IP addresses, the start and end times, the total source and destination bytes, the total source and destination packets, and the protocol type. For analysis purposes, we took a small slice of the data; specifically, of the nearly 700,000 unique observations from June 17, 2010 we choose a random sample of 61,832 which allowed us to more efficiently carry out some preliminary work with the data. Of those protocols, 61,651 were normal traffic and 181 were malicious attacks. Using the external labels provided by UNB, we saw that all 181 attacks were an SSH protocol, though there were 27 other SSH attempts that were simply normal timing between attacks and normal traffic is that the benign traffic is usually initiated by a human user whereas the attacks are generally
BOTnets executing commands at a much higher rate than the average person ever could.
Preliminary Results
A. Initial efforts
The purpose of our project changed direction a few times from the normal traffic protocols were classified as "attack", essentially drowning out the 12 that we had correctly assigned as attacks. The relatively low amount of SSH in the larger dataset meant that clustering methods would have low false positive rates, but also low accuracy rates. Clearly, using the dataset in its entirety was not going to work for clustering purposes.
Even once we focused in on the SSH traffic by itself, clustering methods could not properly parse out malicious SSH attempts from the benign attempts because, of the 208 SSH protocols in the sample, 181 of them were malicious. In reality, there should be far fewer instances of attack than normal traffic in any given type of protocol. Again, we were able to illuminate the issues with our dataset by running a linear discriminant analysis on the SSH attempts alone. Of the 181 attacks, we accurately predicted that 179 of them were in fact attacks. However, of the 27 remaining normal protocols, our model assessed 22 of them as being attacks. Thus, our model had a generally high accuracy rate but a high false positive rate as well.
Subsection A in Section 5 describes the methods by which we were able to correct both the issue of low accuracy and that of high false positive rates. We focused solely on SSH traffic (disregarding other protocol types) and added more normal SSH data so that there was far more normal traffic in our dataset than there was attack data.
Additionally, we made slight changes to the types of variables across which we carried out the k-means clustering.
Final Results
A. Dataset modification and variables
As stated above, one of the main issues we encountered in our preliminary attempts to analyze the network traffic for SSH attacks was that there were simply not enough SSH attacks to make any significant claims about the data. Thus, the first step we took to improve our predictive capability was to expand the data set to one that contained far more normal SSH data than it did attack data. In any network, it is not unreasonable to assume that normal SSH protocol will outnumber any malicious traffic in the network. Likewise, it is likely that an IDS searching for an SSH attack will analyze only SSH data, meaning that we could essentially ignore other types of protocols and just build a dataset that consisted of only SSH traffic. In order to build a dataset with more SSH, we used the other six days of data in the UNB ISCX dataset.
Whereas the SSH Brute Force data was compiled on June 17, 2010 the dataset contains other network traffic that was analyzed from June 11 to June 16, 2010 including denial of service attacks and days of normal activity. Each of these six days contain plenty of benign SSH data that we used in order to establish a baseline for normal SSH. In total, our new dataset contained a total of 14,449 instances of SSH being used. Of those 14,449 observations, there were still only 181 that were attacks. This ratio of normal to malicious is far more realistic than our original dataset.
Another issue we faced when analyzing our original data was that the variables on which we were conducting the k-means clustering, and verifying by linear discriminant analysis, were not ideal indicators of a brute force attack. Although timing effects were definitely an important factor in identifying attacks, we needed to rework the way in which we considered the time. In the other words, rather than looking at the consolidation and analysis of traffic data is twofold. In almost any situation, a low time interval is ideal since we hope to identify and block attacks as soon as possible -the difference between 2 and 60 seconds can be drastic when it comes to protecting a network. However, 2 seconds of data provides far less information to an IDS than 60 seconds, so there are benefits to allowing the detector to gather more data before making a conclusion about a given protocol or piece of traffic. Thus, we tested our detection methods on six different intervals. An example of our data output for the 10 second interval is shown in Table 1 . The attack cluster was selected based on the average packet size of each cluster. On average, the payload data in the normal traffic was around 119kB whereas the payload data in the attack traffic was 61kB.
Thus, in each scenario, we choose the cluster with the significantly smaller average packet size as the attack cluster.
The final results for the ability of the k-means++ algorithm to detect SSH brute force attacks are shown below in Table 3 and Table 4 : Our results show that, in general, k-means++ is not a very reliable method of brute force detection when using these variables to create
clusters. Looking at intervals of 5 seconds appears to result in the highest accuracy rate and the lowest false positive rate. However, the 5 second interval also produces the 3 rd highest false negative rate. Across all three metrics (accuracy, false positives, and false negatives), it appears that where an observation interval succeeds in one metric, it fails in another.
One possible explanation for the shortcomings of the k-means++ algorithm is that we did not include enough variables in the clustering algorithm. Although we choose the four variables that we believed would have the largest impact on the clustering, we could have tried to include other variables, such as specific IP data. Incorporating the quantity and frequency of packets being sent to and from specific IP address may have shed more light on which packets were part of an SSH attack. Another more likely explanation is that anomaly-based intrusion detection often fails when it comes to detecting subtle differences in network traffic. In other words, had the SSH brute force attack caused a more noticeable shift in the dynamics of the network, the k-means++ algorithm would have had a much easier time labelling the attack as such. However, where the SSH attack was rather inconspicuous in nature (likely an intention of the attacker), the k-means++ algorithm had difficulties.
Anomaly-based detection systems work well when data is truly anomalous and work best when they are paired with other systems such as a signature-based IDS.
C. Future work
Our work here lays a ground work for future exploration of the k-means++ algorithm and its ability to detect SSH brute force attacks. By looking at the data through the lens of different time intervals, we note that cluster analysis can produce varying levels of output. Future work can expand on our work in a few ways.
First, the k-means++ algorithm should be paired up with signaturebased capabilities in the future. Given that real world data does not often give clear-cut evidence to what is normal data and what is an attack, k-means++ will more than likely fall short of being able to make highly accurate predictions. In order to detect more inconspicuous attacks, a signature-based method that takes into account known vulnerabilities and attacks should be coupled with the ability of k-means++ to detect changes in the dynamic of the network traffic.
In order to enact a combined signature-based and anomaly-based system, future research would need to take into account the data that the packets are carrying, something that we did not do since the payload data in our sample was encrypted. Analyzing packet headers through protocol analysis as well as understanding a packet's entire payload would greatly increase the chance that an improved IDS could detect an attack and would greatly reduce the false negative rate of the system.
Another expansion of our results should look at the practicality of different detection time intervals. If, for instance, it only takes an attacker 30 seconds to brute force a given password, then using observation intervals of 60 seconds is useless since it allows an attacker to conduct a full attack before we even begin to notice it. Dictionary style attacks further complicate this issue, especially since users rarely employ enough randomness in their password generation to beat these attacks. Therefore, future works should look to combine functional IDS with realworld attacker tendencies.
